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AGGREGATE EXPECTED CONSUMER SURPLUS AS A WELFARE INDEX 
WITH AN APPLICATION TO PRICE STABILIZATION* 
William P. Rogerson 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1940s, economists have used aggregate expected 
consumer surplus in order to examine the question of price stabilization 
[2,3,6,7,8,9]. Unfortunately, they have devoted little consideration 
to the assumptions underlying its use. The implicit assumption seems 
to have been that the condition sufficient for consumer surplus to be 
a welfare measure in a world of certainty (constant marginal utility 
of income with respect to price in the relevant market on the part 
of all individuals) is also sufficient for expected consumer surplus 
to be a welfare measure in a world or risk. This paper shows that 
this assumption is untrue in general. 
Fortunately for researchers in applied fields, especially 
for those in agricultural economics, the assumption is true for the 
case where all the stochastic variation in prices originates from the 
supply side of the market. However, if variation in prices also 
originates from the demand side, then additional assumptions are 
required. What is particularly unfortunate is that in some cases of 
demand induced stochastic price variation, these assumptions are 
inconsistent with the ability of stochastic price variation to originate 
from the demand side in the first place. 
*This paper was written when I was supported by National
Science Foundation Grant Number S.O.C. 77-08573 to Robert H. Bates. 
I would like to acknowledge the extremely helpful assistance 
rendered me in writing this paper by Robert H. Bates, Robert Forsythe, 
Roger Noll, James Quirk, Louis Wilde, and two anonymous referees. 
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II. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS l 
Consider an economy with m goods, one firm, and n consumers. 
Adopting a partial equilibrium view of market one, assume that prices 
of other goods, {Pj};=2' are exogenous random variables. As well,
assume the existence of a random variable, V, which affects supply 
of good one, and n random variables,' {Wi}�=l' w1 affecting the ith 
consumer's preferences over goods. Finally, assume that the income 
of the ith consumer, M1, is also a random variabled Large case 
letters will always be used to denote random variables, while the 
smaller case of the same letter will denote a particular realization 
of the random variable. 
The following notation can now be introduced: 
xij' 
Mi, 
ui(xil' • . • ,xin'wi) 
dij (pl'··· ,pm,mi ,w i)'
Amount of good j consumed by consumer i. 
Income of consumer i. 
Utility function of ith consumer 
which is compatible with the expected 
utility hypothesis. 
.th th 
Demand function for J good by i 
consumer. 
g.(p1, ... ,p ,m.,w.), l. m i i
dj' 
01 (pl, • . .  ,pm,mi 
,wi)' 
s.(p1 . • .  ,p ,v) J ' m 
M, 
w, 
P, 
m, 
w, 
p, 
Indirect utility function of ith 
consUiller. 
n 
equals i: d 
i .. l ij
. 
3 
marginal utility of income function. 
for ithconsumer. 
supply function of jth good. 
the vector (M1, .•• ,Mn) 
the vector (w1, ••• ,Wn) 
the vector (P2, .•• ,Pn) 
the vector (IIJ.,•· · ,m�) 
the vector (w1, ••. ,wn) 
the vector (p 2, ••• ,p n) 
Note in particular that P and p are vectors of prices 
excluding price of the first good. 
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Equality of supply and demand in market one determines the 
price in this market. Since the demand and supply for good one are affected 
by the above 2n + m random variables, the price of good one is a function of 
these random variables and is thus itself a random variable. That is, 
price in market one is determined by 
dl(pl,p,m,w) m sl(pl,p,v). 
Given the usual assumptions,2 the implicit function theorem implies 
the existence of a function ¢ defined implicitly by the above. 
Pl = ¢ (p,m,w,v) 
We can compare this case to the case where government can enter 
* 
the market by buying and selling so as to stabilize pl at some constant, p • 
This price is chosen so that government will buy and sell equal amounts over 
the long run and thus hold on average "zero" buffer stocks. The first case, 
that of no government interference, involves p1 being a random variable 
determined by ¢. The second case, that of government stabilization, 
* 
involves p1 being constant at p • More generally, if we allowed government 
the policy option of only partially stabilizing prices, the second case would 
involve p1 being a random variable determined by W (P,W,V,M) where � is 
some function. 
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III. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR AGGREGATE EXPECTED 
CONSUMER SURPLUS TO BE A PARETO WELFARE MEASURE 
Consider the general situation where the set of all possible 
states of the world is n and there are n individuals with preferences 
over n. The i th individual1 s preferences are represented by the real 
valued function y1 defined on n. That is, for x,y and n, we have 
x preferred by individual i to y if and only if yi(x) 
> yi(y). 
Notions of social welfare almost inevitably involve interpersonal 
comparisons; there are some losers and winners. Certainly. however, 
a minimum requirement for any real valued function over n purported 
to represent social welfare is that it be consistent with the Pareto 
criterion. That is, the index should rank one state as being better 
(worse) than another if all individuals evaluate3 it as bei_ng no 
worse (better) and at least one individual evaluates it as being 
better (worse). 
Definition: 
Let A £ n. Then a real valued function on n is called 
Pareto on A if it is consistent with the Pareto criterion 
over A. 
In our case n can be viewed as all probability distribution 
functions over R+nx R
n
x R +n. The distribution functions correspond 
I 
to random vectors (P1,P,W,M). The individuals' preferences are of 
course represented by the functionals which assign the expected 
6 
value of gi under F to the distribution F. Let G be any distribution 
function over the last 3n-l coordinates of R+nx Rnx R+
n. Then let
nG be the set of all elements of n having marginal distribution G 
over the last 3n-l coordinates. We need a social welfare index to 
compare elements of n within the same nG. P,W and M are fixed random 
variables. We compare the results of having P1 be �(P,W, M,V) to P1 
being �(P,W,M,V). That is, for fixed exogenous behavior of other 
prices, we compare the alternatives of having P1 be the random variable 
generated by market forces or of having P1 be some other random 
variable generated by government action. Therefore, any welfare index 
we use to make our decision should be Pareto over nG for every G
4• 
Cast in these terms, we want to know if the expected value 
of aggregate consumer surplus is Pareto over nG for every G. The 
question is best answered by first considering the individual. Let 
E be the expectated value operation, EC1 be the expected value of
consumer surplus for individual i viewed as a function from n to R, 
and EC be the expected value of _aggregate consumer surplus. We will 
call a distribution function constant if it assigns a probability 
of one to a single point. A distribution function will be called 
constant over a subset of the variables it is defined over if the 
relevant marginal distribution function iS constant. COusider·the whole class of 
distributions over all but the first coordinate of R+n x Rn x R+n. 
These are interpreted as distributions for the random vector (P,W,M). 
For any S, a subset of {p2, . . •• �n,w1, . • .  wn,�•···mn}' we can select 
out the distribution functions which are constant for this subset. 
Let �S be these distributions. We can now state the theorem concerning 
individuals. 
Theorem One: 
I. 
_g. 
Proof: 
Fix any i E {l, • • •  ,n}. 
Fix any S :;:_ {p2, . . . •  pn,wi,mi}. 
Then I and II are equivalent. 
ECi represents consumer i's preferences over QG for 
every G in �S • 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Do. 
-2:. .. 0 Dpl 
Do. . 
S -2:. "" a if p. is ·not in • Dpj J 
Do. 
-2:. = 0 if w. is not in S. Dw. i 1 
DO. 
D"2 = O if m. is not in S. m. 1 1 
Only II => I will be proved here. The reverse is more 
difficult and is left to an appendix. 
Let F1 and F 2 be any two elements of QG for some G in 
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�5 • We want to show that using expected consumer surplus to compare 
F1 and F2 gives the same result as using expected utility. The latter, 
b d f. . . h . th 1 Y e inition, represents t e i consumer s preferences. 
<=> 
<=> 
> 
< 
ECi(F1) 
> 
< EC. (F ) 1 2 
8 
00 
J(I dil (z,p,wi,mi)dz)dF1 
p
l 
> 
< J(l dil (z,p,wimi)<jz ) dF2 
P1 
J�gi (pl,p,wi,mi) - gi (oo,p,wi,mi))dFl 
Qi (pl,p'wi ,mi) 
f (gi (pl ,p,wi ,mi) -:- .gi (w,p,wi ,mi)' dF 2 \ O.(p1,p,w. m.) / l. l.' l. 
This last step is by Roy's duality theorem. See Quirk [41, page 
55, for a derivation. Now for each argument of Qi' either Qi is constant 
with respect to it because the derivative of Ci with respect to it is zero 
or both F1 and F2 have constant marginals for the variable. Therefore by 
evaluating 0. at the points of probability one and calling this number 
1 
* 
6. , we have 1 
<=>I 
ECi(F1) 
> 
< ECi(F2) 
1 
�1 
J (gi (pl,p,wi,mi) - 81 (oo,p,wi,mi)t\ 
9 
� o�* J �i (pl'p,wi,mi) - gi (oo,p,wi,mi' dFZ 
<=> 
O�* f gi(pl,p'wi,mi) dFl > 1 J< Oi* gi(pl,p' wi,mi) dF2 
<='> f gi (pl,p;wi,mi) dFl > < J gi(pl,p,wi,mi) dFZ 
The second to the last step is pos�ible because the marginals of 
F1 and F2 are the same over (p,w1,m1). The last step is possible because 
* standard consumer theory predicts 01 is always positive. 
D 
The translation to sufficient conditions for aggregate 
expected consumer surplus to be Pareto over nG for every G is now 
innnediate. The question of necessary conditions is discussed in 
the appendix. The sufficient conditions are, in a practical sense, 
"close11 to being necessary. This should be kept in mind during the 
discussion in section IV. 
Theorem Two: 
Fix any Sc {p2, • • •  ,p ,w1, • • •  ,w , m.. , . . .  m }. - n n .L  n 
Suppose the following hold for every i. 
(i) Do.1 = 0 
Dpl 
(ii) Do.
= 0 if p. is not in S 1 
n?:" J 
J 
(iii) Do. 1 = 0 if w. is not in s 
Dw.  1 1 
(iv) Do. 1 = 0 if m. is not in S 
Dm. 1 1 
Then EC is a Pareto welfare index over nG for every 
G in l!.5• 
Proof: 
Let Fl and F2 be elements of !itG for some G. Then 
_
EC(F1) 
> 
< EC(F2) 
<=> f (Ji·� 1 dil (z,p,wi,mi)dz) dF1 
> 
< 
P1 
00 n 
)J(J i � 1 dil (z,p,wi,mi)dz dF2 p
l 
10 
<-> 
> 
< 
n ® \ 
i : l f(f dil(z,p,wi,mi) dz } dFl 
P1 
i � 1 J ( J dil (z,p,wi,mi) dz) dF2 
P1 
n 
<==> z 8�* f gi(pl,p,wi,mi) dFl 
> 
< 
i = 1 
n 
r 
i"" 1 o\Jgi(pl,p,w. m . )  dF2 l. l., l. 
11 
This last step uses the results in theorem one. Therefore, 
within a given QG' EC operates like a positive weighted sum of the 
individual utility indexes. A function of this type is of course Pareto. 
D 
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IV INTERPRETATION 
Theorem One states that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for expected consumer surplus to represent a consumer's preferences 
over changes in the random variable P1 is that the marginal utility 
of income be constant not only with respect to P1 but also with respect 
to any other factor which is a random variable. Theorem Two points 
out that if this condition is satisfied for every consumer, then aggregate 
expected consumer surplus is merely a positive weighted sum of individual 
expected consumer surplus. Therefore, aggregate expected surplus is Pareto. 
The simplest case is that where V is the only random element; 
P,W, and Mare all constant. In terms of the supply and demand curves 
for market ,one, the supply curve is shifting but demand is stationary. 
In this case, the sufficient condition for EC to be a Pareto measure 
is that every consumer's marginal utility of income be constant with 
respect to P1• This is, of course, the condition for the case of 
certainty as well. Therefore, if all stochastic variation originates 
from the supply curve, the condition sufficient for aggregate consumer 
surplus to be Pareto in a riskless world is also sufficient for EC to 
be Pareto in a world of risk. 
Two particular cases of demand induced stochastic variation 
can be shown to never satisfy the sufficient conditions for EC to be 
Pareto. First is the case where fluctuations in income cause demand 
5 to shift. In this case, the sufficient conditions for EC to be Pareto 
imply that income changes could not produce demand changes. That is, 
observation of income induced demand shifts in and of itself 
constitutes evidence that the sufficient conditions cannot hold. 
In principle, therefore, aggregate expected consumer surplus cannot 
be used as a welfare measure for cases of income induced stochastic 
price variation. This argument is proved in theorem three. 
Theorem Three: 
DOi 
Do. 
If 0 and 
1 
= 0 
Dm. 
-
D PJ. 1 
then Ddil
� · 0 1 
Proof: 
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We prove the contrapositive. From Roy' s duality theorem (dropping_ 
the subscript i for consumer i). 
dl - 1'a Dpl 
Dg 
Diil 
-Qa 
Dpi 
0 
Differentiate both sides with respect to m, which yields 
__D_ 
DIJ.Dm
- Do 
Dm 
xl - §
The result now follows immediately. 
Dd1 
Dm 
D 
14 
The same type of problem arises for a special case where 
W is random. If W. affects the consumer' s marginal utility with respect i 
to the jth good, then the consumer's demand for x. will vary randomly J 
as a function of W • • As a consequence, if we assume 1 . 
Dzg_ 
that--'- is 
Dw.Dp. 1 J 
unequal to zero for some i, we should also allow P. to be a J 
nonconstant random variable. 6 In this situation, if W affects 
each marginal utility in the same direction. 
Dzg 
( Dw.�.is non-negative for every j or is non-positive for every j), 
1 
J 
then the sufficient conditions for EC to be a pareto measure 
cannot occur. The followiilg proof·-of this fact Will also make 
clear that 1n the general case, the assumption 
Doi that o;- .. 
i 
0 amounts to a restriction of the vector 
( Dzgi Dzg.)
IM- D , • • •  , ---
1 to a particular hyperplane in R
n. Only very 
i pl Dw'iPn 
special cases of W affecting utility are thus consistent with the 
sufficient conditions for EC to be a correct measure. 
Theorem Four 
If u1 • £1 (x11, . . •  ,x1n, w1) and 
2 D u1 
--- < Dw.Dx .. 1 1J 
0 for j "" 1, . • .  ,.e. 
0 for j = l+l, • • •  ,n 
2 
or 
D u1 
DwiDxij
> 0 for j=l, . . •  ,l 
= 0 for j=l+l, • • .  ,n 
D01 
= then ]):.l'i 
Proof: 
D<\ 
0 -> DP." 
J 
rf 0 for some j=l, • . .  ,l. 
By totally differentiating the first order conditions we 
obtain (dropping the subscript i for conswner i) 
dx1 
dxn 
dA 
I 
�] 
where A = 
Ull 
unl 
pl 
uln 
-Adp1 - u dw lw 
-Adpn 
- u dW nw 
n 
- :E x.dp1 + d m
i•l l. 
pl 
unn pn 
Pn 0 
and A . . is the ijth cofactor of A, - A is the marginal utility of 1J 
income, and u1 = D2u w --DwD pi 
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Now DA suppose -- • Dpj 
0 v j = l, . . .  .e. 
Then 0 • DA 
DP." J 
A. 
= -A i�i+l 
IA 
- xj 
A n+l,n+l 
IAI 
Therefore A. n+l . ' � has the same sign for every J "' 1, · · ·-L· IAI 
Now DA 
l A. ,n+l 
DW.= -.E � ujW" i J""'l JA i 
Since the ujw also all have the same sign, �� consists of the sum of 
a group of similarly signed non-zero elements. DA Therefore j)W of. 0. 
D 
16 
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V. AN EXAMPLE 
The following is an example of a one consumer world where 
expected consumer surplus ranks the alternatives of stabilization vs. 
nonstabilization differently than does expected utility. The source 
of random variation is the price of good x and government is considering 
stabalizing the price of good y. Let the consumer's utility function be 
u(x,y) = 2y1/2 + x 
With corresponding indirect utility function 
2 
P + mP x y g (px,py;m) = P P x y 
Let P be the random variable x 
{ 1, with probability . 7 
p x '"' 4, with probability • 3 
and let the supply curve for y be 
2 s = Py 
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The price of good y detennined by supply and demand equilibriating is then 
p =�y x 
* 
The buffer stock price, p , of good y is that price which makes the �xpected 
value of govenunent purchases, b, zero. 
E(b) = 0 -> E (
p
p
� - p;) = 0 
E(P�) y 2 -> -- - p  = O  2 y 
* 
-> p 
Py 
4/E(P�) 
We now need to calculate four numbers: the expected utility 
from each policy and the expected consumer surplus from each policy. 
Expected Utility From Stabilization: 
E g(P,p
*) =E x * 
( pl+ "'P* )
x p xp 
E(P ) 
m 
X 4,/ + m E(-1) 
E(P2) 
p 
x 
x 
Expected Utility from No Stabilization: 
p 2  +.mJI 
E•(P P ) •E o x' Y 
x y 
p pxy 
= E (ff) +m E( p1) x x 
Expected Consumer Surplus from Stabilization 
( 
® p 2 )
EC(P ,p* ) -E I � dp x 
* p-
y 
p y 
= E (:: 
) 2 ECPx) 
� E(Px 
= E( p 2)3/4 x 
19 
Expected Consumer Surplus from No Stabilization: 
® 
p2 
_!..__ dp 
Py y 
EC ( p x' p y) E f 
Py 
® 
p2 
E f x T dp 
.;p 
y y 
x 
p 2 
E x - = E( 3/2 ./P 1'x )
x 
Therefore the gains from stabilization according to the expected 
utility index are 
E( p ) 
_x_ -
V::-:-T.( 2)
E(./P) x 
E PX 
Substituting in yields the answer -.0593. The expected utility 
criterion thus says that government should not stabilize prices. 
The gains from stabilization according to the expected consumer 
surplus index are 
[E ( p 2) ]3/4 _ E(P 3/2). x x 
Substituting in yields +.4914. The expected consumer surplus index 
thus says that government should stabilize prices, which contradicts 
the conclusion drawn from the expected utility index. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The use of aggregate expected consumer surplus to analyze 
the welfare implications of stochastic price variation requires no 
assumptions other than those that are required for the use of this 
method under conditions of certainty provided that the source of 
price variation lies solely in the supply curve of the problem. In 
the case of demand side variation, however, consumer surplus yields 
an ordering consistent with the Pareto criterion only when further 
assumptions are made. If variation in other prices causes demand 
side variation, then it is sufficient to additionally assume that 
the marginal utilities of income of all consumers be constant with 
respect to these prices. If variations in natural events such as 
rainfall or sunshine cause demand variation by directly affecting 
utility, the additional sufficient assumption amounts to be very 
restrictive condition on the nature of the effect of the event 
on preferences. Finally, in the case where random variation of 
income induces stochastic demand variation, observation of this 
phenomena in and of itself constitutes evidence that the sufficient 
conditions for EC to be a correct measure cannot occur. 
In general, therefore, it seems that aggregate expected 
consumer surplus is most useful when stochastic varation results 
primarily from the supply side and does not significantly affect 
prices of other goods either indirectly through general equilibrium 
21 
effects or directly through affecting supply curves of related markets. 
APPENDIX 
The main purpose of this appendix is to derive a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a function over Rn to represent a 
22 
consumer's preferences over density functions over Rn when comparisons 
between density functions are restricted to those where the density 
functions have the same marginal distributions with respect to the 
last t variables. As a corollary, we will have a necessary and 
sufficient condition for expected consumer surplus to represent a 
consumer's preferences between price stabilization policies. 
Furthermore, we will be able to discuss the correctness of aggregate 
expected consumer surplus in similar situations. 
First , some notation and definitions must be introduced. 
- s t Let Z = R , X = R , and Y � R • Call Q the set of all density 
functions on z. Allow n to include discrete random variables (or 
mixtures of discrete and continuous random variables) by interpreting 
integration as summation when necessary. Call Og the set of all 
elements of n with marginal distribution g over Y. For any real 
valued measurable function u on Z and f 8 n, define Eu(f) by 
Eu(f) I u(x,y) f (x,y) dxdy. 
Consider any relation i on n. We will say u represents � on n if 
Eu(f1) 
> 
< Eu(f2) iff f1 
> 
- f2 < 
for every f1, f2 8 Q. Representation over ng is defined in an 
analogous fashion. 
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The content of the expected utility theorem7 is that we can 
make a number of assumptions about i which allow us to conclude that 
there is a real valued function u over Z which represents :. 
Furthermore, for any other real-valued function, u*, on Z, u* 
represents � if and only if u* = au+b, where a and b are constants 
and a > O. We are interested in finding necessary and sufficient 
conditions for u* to represent � on Qg for every g. This is a 
weaker requirement than representing � on n. In the former u* 
only has to be correct when comparing density functions with the 
same marginal distributions. In the latter, u* has to be correct 
when comparing any two density functions. Therefore we expect a 
somewhat weaker necessary-and sufficient conditions than u* = au+b 
where a > 0 to emerge. Two definitions are needed to state the 
theorem.. For ye Y, we call the fibre of y the set Xx y. For 
two elements y0 and y1 of Y, we say that there is a preference 
reversal between the fibres of y0 and y1 if there are two density 
functions f' and f11 over x such that 
(£',yo)> Cf",yo) 
and (f11,y1) > (f' ,y1) where one of the > signs may be �­
The ordered pair (f,y) denotes the dens�ty �unct�on with 
marginal density f over x and discrete marginal density of y with 
probability 1 over Y. A preference reversal between two fibres simply 
means that the consumer's preferences between two densities over x 
depend on what value of Y he receives. 
Tb.eorelll 5: 
Let � be a relation over n and let u be a real valued 
function representing S Then for any measurable real valued 
function u* defined on Z, the following three statements are 
equivalent. 
I 
II 
III 
u* represents $ over n for every g. g 
u* (x,y) a(y) · u(x,y) + b(y) 
where 
* 
(i) a(y) > 0 for every y. 
(ii) a(y0) a(y1) 
if there is a preference 
reversal between the fibres of y0 and y1. 
u (x,y) a(y) · u(x,y) + b(y) 
where 
(i) a(y) > 0 for every y. 
(ii) a (y) is constant over y if there is one 
instance of a preferce reversal between 
two fibres. 
24 
� 
II-<> III: 
Suppose there is at least one instance of a preference 
reversal between the fibres of two points y0 and y1• Then 
a(y0) = a(y1). Consider any point y e Y. There must be a 
preference reversal between y and one of y0 and y1• Therefore 
a(y) • a(y0) • a(y1).
25 26 
ill-=> I: 
> Eu*(f1) - Eu*(f2) < 
<-> f u*(x,y) f1(x,y) dxdy � f u*(x,y) f2(x,y) dxdy 
<-> f a(y) u(x,y) f1(x,y) dxdy � f a(y) u(x,y) f2(x,y) dxdy 
because b is not a function of x and the marginal distributions of £1 
and £2 with respect to y are the same. 
<-> f a(y) c1(y) g(y) dy � f a(y) c2(y) g(y) dy(*) 
where c1(y) is the conditional expectation of u(x,y) using £1(x,y).
Now if c1(y) � c2(y) for every y we know that since a(y) > 0 that 
in fact * is equivalent to 
I cl(y) g(y) dy � f c2(y) g(y) dy. (**) 
Similarly if c1(y) � c2(y) for every y, we know * is equivalent to ** 
However, ** is equivalent to 
> Eu(f1) - Eu(f2) < 
and we are done. This leaves the case where there are y', y" e Y 
such that 
cl (y
') > c2(y') 
and c2 (y") > c1 (y") 
where one of the inequalities need not be strict. However, this is 
precisely the condition for there to be a preference reversal between 
the fibres of y' and y". Therefore a(y) is constant on Y. It is now 
clear that * is once again equivalent to ** 
27 
I -:> II: 
Part I: 
First we will show that u*(x,y) = a(y) u(x,y) + b(y) where 
a(y) > 0 for every y. This is because, by assumption, for any fixed 
y, u* and u both represent the same order of density functions over x. 
Therefore, for a fixed y 
u*(x,y) = a u(x,y) + b 
where a > 0, by the regular expected utility theorem. When y varies, 
convex combination of y0 and y1, which is a contradiction. To do 
this, let Oy1 + (l-O)y2 denote the density function over Y 
oy1 + <1-0) 
f y1, with probability 0 y 0 2 
y2, with probability (1-0) 
Our two density functions over Z are then (£', Cy + (1-0) y2) 
and (f", Oy1 + (1-0) y2) where the marginals are independent. 
28 
Now we choose 0 so u is indifferent between them. That is, we solve 
then a and b depend on it in general. 0 Eu(f', y1) + (1-0) Eu(f1,y2) 
Part II: 
We now show that if there is a preference reversal between the 
fibres of y1 and y2 that a(y1) = a(y2).
Suppose, for contradictio�, that there are points y1, y2 in Y 
such that there is a preference reversal between their fibres but 
a(y1) # a(y2). Since there is a preference reversal we know there 
are density functions f' and f" on x such that 
and 
(f' ,yl) > (f" , yl) 
(f",y2) > (f' ,y2) 
where one of the inequalities need not be strict. 
Now the procedure will be to construct two density functions over 
Z by taking a convex combination of y1 and Yz and pairing it alternately 
' 
with f and f". It will be shown that u ranks the two densities as 
equal yet u* ranks one as preferred to the other. Then we are done 
for u and u* cannot represent the same order over ng where g is the 
- 0 Eu(f" , y1) - (1-o) (f" , y2) 0 
This yields 
Eu(f" ,y2) - Eu(f' , y2) 
0 = (Eu(f",y2) - Eu(f' ,y2)) + (Eu(f' , y1) - Eu(f", y1)) 
But by the preference reversal assumption, it is clear that 0 E (0,1) 
As well, since a(y1) � a(y2), it is easy to see that 
0 
0 
Eu*(f' , y1) + (1-o) 
Eu*(f",y1) - (1-o) 
Eu*(f' ,y2) 
Eu*(f11,y2) #< 0 
Therefore we have constructed the desired density functions and are done. 
0 
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Suppose that there are a number of preference relations 
� i corresponding to different consumers- It is clear that a 
sufficient condition for the aggregate index E (tut(x,y)) to be 
Pareto S on Qg for every g is that u� represent � i on Qg for every i 
g and i. In this case E(�u�(x,y) is equivalent to E(tu.(x,y)), which 
il. i1 
is obviously Pareto since it is a positive weighted sum of expected 
utilities. It is not strictly necessary that u� represent � i on ng 
i 
for every i and g in order for E(Eut(x,y)) to be correct on every Qg, 
i 
however. For example, suppose that Eu! and Eui agree on all pairs of
density functions in which one Pareto dominates the other and both 
are in the same Qg. Then it is fairly easy to prove that 
E(Eut(x,y)) is Pareto on Qg for every g even though ut does not 
i 
necessarily represent � i on Qg for any i or g. The extreme case 
of this is where no distribution dominates another one. Then every 
index on the space is Pareto. 
However, there are definitely collections of preferences 
in which it is necessary for u� to represent � i on Qg for every i 
i 
and g in order for E(Eu�(x,y)) to be Pareto (the case where all 
i 1 
consumers are identical). Therefore if we want to specify a method 
for constructing an aggregate welfare index of the form E(Eu�(x,y))
i i 
which will yield a Pareto welfare index on Qg when applied to all 
possible collections of preferences, it is necessary that each ut 
, represent �. i on each Qg. As a practical matter then, the preference 
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representation condition is also necessary. This will remain so until 
someone demonstrates that there is a broad class of economies (con-
taining all the ones we are likely to run across) in which it is not 
necessary. 
We can now apply this theory to our case of interest. The 
subscript i for consumer i will be dropped until we discuss aggregate 
consumer surplus. We let Z represent prices with X representing p1 
and Y representing Pz through pn. The utility function representing 
� is the consumer' s indirect utility function, 
g(pl . .  ·Pn) · 
For this interpretation I will assume income remains constant and 
events such as rainfall do not directly affect utility? for notational 
simplicity, although they can easily be included as part of Y. 
Note that the existence of a preference reversal on two 
fibres now can be interpreted as an instance of non-neutrality of 
risk with respect to changes in Pz through pn. If only the expected 
value of p1 mattered to the consumer we would expect the random 
variable with the lower expected value to be chosen on any fibre. No 
preference reversals would then occur. However, if other aspects of 
the distribution counted, then there would be a possibility for 
preference reversals. For example, suppose p1 and Pi have the same 
expected value but Pi has a higher variance. When Pz through pn are 
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are extremely low the consumer might then possess enough extra income 
to prefer a gamble and select Pi over p1• However at higher prices of 
P2 through pn he might prefer the alternative with less risk. Therefore 
a preference reversal consists of a case where the consumer's attitudes 
towards the higher moments of the distribution of p1 changed enough 
with changes in Pz through pn to affect his choice. This is a very 
natural definition of being risk non-neutral with respect to changes in 
p2 through Pn· For the rest of this discussion I will assume that the 
consumer is not totally risk neutral with respect to p2 through Pn· 
This allows me to assume that a(y) in Theorem Five is constant, 
Now, letting CS be the consumer surplus function on Rn, 
we can easily prove the following corollary from Theorem Five. The 
proof is unaltered if we allow more than one price to change and use 
line integrals. 
Corollary 5-a: 
Suppose the consumer is not totally risk neutral with 
respect to p2 through Pu· Then CS is a representation of : over Og 
for every g if and only if the marginal utility of income is constant 
with respect to all prices. 
Proof: 
CS is a representation of � over Qg for every g 
<-> DCS 
Dpl 
(pl, • • •  ,pn) = a  lliL (p ' • • •  ,pn) Dpl l 
where a is some positive constant. 
00 
<-> D�l f xl(P,Pz,···Pn) dp P1 
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- a • A(pl, · · . ,pn) • xl (pl,·· . ,pn) 
where a is some positive constant and A is the marginal utility of income. 
<=> -xl (pl,p2' · ·• ,pn) "" -a • A(p1•·· · ,pn) • xl (pl,··· ,pn) 
where a is some positive constant. 
<=> aA(p , • • •  ,p ) = 1 for some positive constant a .  1 n 
<-> A(p1, . . .  ,pn) is a constant (A is always positive). 
0 
This result is interesting in that it adds another separate reason for 
requiring that A be constant. Furthermore it places much stronger 
requirements on A. Just considering CS as a utility index, we know 
that in the multivariable consumer surplus case (where more than one 
price is allowed to change) the integral used to calculate consumer 
surplus is path independent if and only if A is constant with respect 
to the prices which are changing. 9 However, when only one price is 
allowed to change there is no such problem. In fact, if the demand 
curve slopes downward, consumer surplus is obviously a utility index 
for the consumer over fibres of p2 . . .  pn. Both CS and g slope downward, 
so there is obviously a monotone transformation relating them 
regardless of whether or not A is fixed. However, corollary 5-a states 
that in the case where prices are all random variables, A must be 
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constant even in the one variable case as well as in the multivariate 
case. Furthermore, A must be constant with respect to every price 
which experiences stochastic variation, not merely with respect to 
those which are changed. 
We therefore know that a constant marginal utllity of 
income with respect to prices that are random variables is sufficient 
for aggregate expected consumer surplus to be a correct welfare 
measure. Furthermore, it is also necessary to assume that the marginal 
utility of income is constant with respect to prices which are random 
variables if we want to guarantee that aggregate expected consumer 
surplus will work in all possible cases. The same comments apply to 
income and natural events if they vary randomly (and if, in the 
latter case, they directly enter the utility function). 
l. 
2. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Readers unfamiliar with the literature might refer to Massel [2] 
or Turnovsky [6,7]. 
Assume that 
(i) d1 and s1 are defined and have continuous first derivatives 
for positive prices and incomes and for the ranges of W and V. 
(ii) For every positive (p,m) and every (w,v) in the range of (W,V), 
there exists a unique positive p1 which satisfies 
dl •1 
(iii) When evaluated at the points described in (ii), 
Dd1 
Dpl 
.; 
DS1 
Dpl 
That is, we simply assume that demand and supply are continuously 
differentiable, always intersect once and only once and never 
have the same slope at the point where they intersect. This 
last assumption can of course be guaranteed by assuming that 
demand slopes downward and supply slopes upward. 
3. The evaluation is of course carried out using the individuals' 
utility functions. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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Although G is fixed, the welfare index should work for any fixed G. 
If just consumer i's income is shifting we might not expect this 
to cause a significant shift of aggregate demand. Therefore the 
following discussion is most relevant in a case where all consumers 
incomes are varying together, possibly due to the business cycle. 
That is, we use a general equilibrium argument to infer what partial 
equilibrium situations are plausible. 
7. See DeGroot [l] for a treatment of the expected utility theorem. 
8. Recall this term was defined on page 5. 
9. See Silberburg [5]. 
[l] 
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